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Abstract 
Usually, only initial revenue ffects of personal income tax reforms are considered. However, atax reform character- 
ized by base broadening in exchange for rate reduction can reduce the income elasticity of tax revenue. In that 
case, the increase in revenue after income growth will be relatively smaller: the tax reform has a negative ffect 
on revenue in the second period. Using the microtax model of the Central Planning Bureau we simulated the 
effects of the Dutch "Oort" reform 1990 on revenue lasticities and, consequently, on tax revenue. The income 
tax revenue lasticity declined by 17 percent which caused an additional revenue loss of 0.6 percent in 1990, 
rising to 3.8 percent in 1993. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 1980s, many OECD countries implemented tax reforms characterized bybase broaden- 
ing, reduction of tax rates, and flattening of the rate structure (Cnossen and Messere, 1990). 
Generally, these reforms are designed under a revenue constraint. In some cases, for exam- 
ple, a framework of revenue neutrality has been chosen. However, in this context, only 
initial effects of tax reform on revenue--that is, effects at unchanged pretax incomes--are 
taken into account. Not only behavioral responses but also general income growth are ig- 
nored. In this paper we show that there will be additional effects on revenue in the years 
beyond the reform. The reason is that base broadening in exchange for rate reduction can 
reduce the elasticity of income tax revenue. This implies that the increase in revenue in 
case of nominal income growth will be smaller. Such additional effects are otten overlooked 
in practice but can nonetheless be substantial. 
The revenue lasticity of the personal income tax with respect to income has been ana- 
lyzed by Tanzi (1969, 1976), Wellink (1975), Hutton and Lambert (1980, 1982), Fries, 
Hutton, and Lambert (1982), and Ram (1991). These authors have estimated elasticities 
with historical, macro, or cross-section data. In this paper we estimate revenue lasticities 
with a micro model. This approach makes it possible to identify determinants of the change 
in revenue lasticity (in line with the work of Fries, Hutton, and Lambert, 1982). We simu- 
late the effects of a major tax reform in the Netherlands (the "Oort" reform) on the income 
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tax revenue lasticity. Consequently, we are able to calculate the impact of this reform on 
tax revenue after nominal pretax income growth. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define and elaborate the income lastic- 
ity for a progressive tax system. Section 3 deals with the effects of base broadening. Sec- 
tions 4 and 5 document the Dutch tax reform in 1990 and the model used to analyze the 
effects of this reform. Sections 6 and 7 present empirical results for the income lasticities 
and the revenue ffects. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Income elasticity in a progressive tax system 
Our analysis of the income elasticity of a tax system starts at the micro level. The revenue 
elasticity of an individual taxpayer i with respect o nominal pretax income is 
T//" d--~/" (1) 
This micro elasticity concept, also referred to as liability progression, is commonly used 
in the literature on tax progression and redistribution (Musgrave and Thin, 1948; Jakobsson, 
1976; Kakwani, 1977; Norregaard, 1990). I In this paper we focus on the responsiveness 
of tax revenue to nominal income growth. Therefore we define the macro income lasticity 
(lr~v) as the weighted average of the individual income elasticities: 
~'~ "/1" i " T/ 
i=|  
7r~v = (2) 
W~v is the proportionate change in ~Ti from a small equiproportionate increase in all pretax 
incomes. It can be used as a measure for the macro revenue lasticity of a tax system (Hutton 
and Lambert, 1980, p. 905; OECD, 1984, pp. 38--41). 
We start by deriving the income elasticity in a piecewise linear tax system with k tax 
rates tl < t2 . . . . .  < t k. Taxable income is defined as pretax income Y. minus m deduc- 
tions D~,m. With Bj denoting the income ceiling ofthejth tax bracket, tax liability for indi- 
viduals in the kth bracket can be written as 
k-1 z 
for Y/ ~ E Bj + E Di,m" (3) 
j= l  m=l 
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We denote the income elasticity of deductions by ai,m. In most cases deductions are 
either a fixed amount, such as personal exemptions (aim = 0), or a fixed proportion of 
pretax income (ai, m = 1). 2 From (3), the income tax elasticity for individuals in the kth 
income bracket is then given by (see Fries, HuRon, and Lambert, 1982, p. 149): 
I ~ 1 k-I z 
tk" Yi - ai'm" Di'm Z Bj" (tk -- tj) tk" E (1 -- ai,m)" Di,m 
ra= l ri = T/ =1 + j=l rnfl 
T i + T/ (4) 
Equation (4) shows that the income elasticity depends on the rate structure and on the size 
and income elasticities of deductions. 
3. Tax reform by broadening the tax base 
In this section we illustrate the effect on the income elasticity r i of eliminating the d duc- 
tion Di,~, in exchange for a uniform proportionate r duction in tax rates sufficient o keep 
revenue constant at the initial level and distribution fpretax income. Such a proportionate 
reduction in tax rates clearly has no effect on the income elasticity ri. 
The income elasticity after tax reform (a'i') is given by 
Yi - ~ ai,., " Dim mr2 
~i' = (5) 
Yi - O,. m - ~ Bj " 
=2 j=l L tk J 
It can be shown from equations (4) and (5) that, if there is no change in the individual's 
income bracket and ai, 1 _< 1 (a condition that is normally satisfied), then ~r i' < 7r i. Thus, 
under these circumstances, the elimination of a deduction reduces the income elasticity 
of the tax system. This effect is greater, the less income-elastic the deduction is. The intui- 
tive reasoning is quite simple. If deductions are income-related, pretax income growth causes 
a smaller increase in taxable income compared to the case that deductions are income ine- 
lastic. Income-inelastic deductions, such as personal exemptions, imply a higher liability 
progression and thus, if eliminated, a larger reduction in liability progression. 
However, the elimination of Di, l can affect the tax bracket hat individual i is in. For 
those individuals falling in higher brackets because of base broadening, there will be an 
additional effect on 7r i. It can be shown that this threshold effect is always positive. Thus, 
in case of a tax jump, the total effect of base broadening on ~ri becomes theoretically am- 
biguous. The magnitude of the threshold effects depends on the degree of progression of 
the rate structure. 
A tax reform as discussed above is revenue neutral with unchanged income. However, 
in case the base-broadening effect is larger than the threshold effect, the micro elasticities 
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and thus the macro revenue lasticity 0ray) as defined in Section 2 will fall. This implies 
that the increase in revenue atter income growth is smaller than it would be without he 
tax reform. 3 In addition, there is revenue loss? 
4. Dutch tax reform in 1990 
On January 1, 1990, a revision of the personal income tax based on the proposals of the 
Oort Commission became ffective in the Netherlands. The main changes in the new legisla- 
tion were as follows (De Kam, 1993): 
9 The personal wage and income tax was fully integrated with the general social security 
contributions, with a combined rate and uniform base. 
9 The tax base was broadened by Dfl 97 billion or by 63 percent, mainly by eliminating 
the deductibility of general social security contributions (Df150 billion) and by lowering 
personal exemptions (Dfl 39 billion). 5The standard personal exemption was reduced by 
38 percent in 1990. 
9 The number of tax brackets was reduced from nine to three. The first income bracket 
was to be taxed at 35.1 percent (a combination of 13 percent taxes and 22.1 percent pre- 
miums). In the second and third income brackets, rates were set at 50 percent and 60 
percent, respectively. The new top rate of 60 percent is much lower than the top rate of 
72 percent in the old system. The rate structure has thus been made less progressive. 
Although the proposals of the Oort Commission were revenue neutral, the actual reform 
package implied a tax reduction amounting to 0.8 percent of GDP. 
On the basis of the analysis in Sections 2 and 3, it can be expected that this taxreform 
has caused a decrease in the macro revenue lasticity. Three elements are relevant here. 
First, we expect a moderate negative ffect from the elimination of the deductibility of 
social security contributions. This deduction is income related but with an average income 
elasticity (Otav) less than 1 because there is an income ceiling. The second factor, the lower- 
ing of the fixed personal exemptions, will have a more substantial negative ffect. Although 
the personal exemptions can be annually adjusted for inflation, we initially do not incorpo- 
rate this inflation correction i  the income tax in our calculations. Following the Ministry 
of Finance, we consider the correction of the income ceilings of tax brackets and of per- 
sonal exemptions for inflation a discretionary policy measure. 6 Finally, the revenue elasticity 
is also expected to decline because of the change in the rate strueture. 
Obviously, other factors, in particular changes in the pretax income distribution (from 
behavioral effects) and changes in the number of taxpayers also have an impact on the revenue 
elasticity (Ram, 1991; Fries, Hutton, and Lambert, 1982; Wellink, 1974). Our analysis, 
however, focuses on the (partial) effect of the tax reform. 
5. The microtax model 
For the calculation of the revenue lasticity of the income tax we used the microtax model 
of the Central Planning Bureau (1988, 1990). This static spreadsheet micro model generates 
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the trajectory from gross to net earnings (and thus tax burdens) for different socioeconomic 
income groups (employees, elf-employed, social security beneficiaries, civil servants, social 
welfare recipients). A selection of nearly 200 representative hypothetical income recipients 
is made, differentiated byincome source, income level, and personal exemptions for single 
persons or sole earners. The data of the model are taken from the annual Dutch Macro 
Economic Outlook. 
Microtax is well suited to simulate the effects of the Oort reform on the income tax revenue 
elasticity. The model is annually available for the years 1988 (before Oort) until 1993 (after 
Oort). It can be used to simulate a marginal equiproportionate nominal growth of all pretax 
incomes and then to calculate individual income tax elasticities and the macro revenue las- 
ticity 7ray (see Section 2). Lambert and Pffiahler (1992, p. 13) also conclude that the most 
promising approach in this kind of empirical work seems to be through (micro) simulation. 
The model only includes standard eductions (such as tandard eduction for cost of 
working and deduction for sickness and unemployment i surance paid by employees). Other 
individual specific deductions are not taken into account (such as interest, charitable gifts, 
exceptional medical costs, alimony payments). The fact that the model does not include 
specific individual deductions i not a serious problem for our analysis. Neglecting these 
deductions (in 1989 20 percent of total deductions) certainly affects the level of the revenue 
elasticity because some of them are very income lastic. On the other hand, it seems unlikely 
to significantly affect the dmnge in revenue lasticity resulting from the tax reform in our 
empirical study. This is because the Oort reform mainly refers to standard eductions. Of 
the total amount of base broadening, 96 percent is accounted for in microtax. Thus, the 
limitations of the model do not seriously affect our results. 
6. Empirical results 
With microtax we calculated all individual tax elasticities (for the total of income tax and 
general social security contributions) for the various ocioeconomic groups, for the years 
1989 and 1990. Figure 1 illustrates the results for employees at different income levels. 
It appears that atter the tax reform elasticities have fallen almost across the board7 The 
figure also illustrates the reduction of the number of tax brackets. As can be seen from 
equation (4), every income ceiling causes a jump in individual tax elasticity (ri). Next, 
we derived weighted average lasticities for each subgroup and finally a weighted average 
revenue lasticity for the total population (~'av). 8 Using this procedure, we calculated a total 
revenue lasticity of 1.475 in 1989 and of 1.220 in 1990. The overall decline in revenue 
elasticity by 17 percent can be characterized as a structural change: calculations for earlier 
and later years indicate almost stable revenue lasticities? 
In order to disentangle the effects of the various elements of the tax reform we have used 
equation (4). First, we calculated the partial effect of eliminating the deduetibility of social 
security contributions. This accounts for 15.3 percent of the decline in the revenue lastic- 
ity. As expected, this effect is only small because this specific deduction is rather strongly 
related to income (aav = 0.809). The reduction of personal exemptions accounts, also in 
line with our expectations, for a much larger share (54.9 percent) of the decline in the 
revenue lasticity. Furthermore, 15.1 percent of the decline in the r venue lasticity can be 
62 KOEN CAMINADA AND KEES GOUDSWAARD 
taX ela~alcity 
21 
1.75 
1.5 
1251 
( : 
I ': ! 1990 post-tax reform 
1 Jrm'rrax'mrrrrr~rrr:n~r~lr~lm'rrrr'arralr rm~n~ rwrrm-rrrrnrrrrrlrm~rmm'nwam~rrmlrrm :Trn*Tm irr~lrrrmr~rn:cn- 
10 20 30 40 50 SO 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150160170 
pre-tax income * 13111000,- 
Source: Own calculations with the micrntax model (Central Planning Bureau, 1990). 
Hgure 1. Income elasticities for individual employees at different income levels. 
attributed to the change in the rate structure. In other words, the flattening of the rate struc- 
ture has a relatively minor effect (see Hutton and Lambert, 1982, p. 151). The remaining 
part of the total decline in the income elasticity (14.7 percent) can be attributed to the 
effect of other deductions and also to (minor) changes in the income distribution and in 
the number of taxpayers. 
It should be noted that these resuks for the change in revenue lasticity include the thresh- 
old effect (see Section 3). A separate simulation shows that the partial threshold effect in- 
creases ray by only 1.2 percentage points. It thus appears that the positive effect on the 
revenue lasticity of individuals changing income brackets because of the elimination of 
deduction, is small compared to the negative ffect of the elimination itself. The resuks 
are summarized in Table 1. 
One could argue that these results are biased because of our assumption that adjustment 
for inflation is not part of the tax system (see Section 4). However, additional simulations 
point out that the effects of tax reform on the income elasticity of the tax system (and thus 
on revenue) are still substantial in case inflation adjustment is systematically applied. With 
personal exemptions and income ceilings fully adjusted for inflation, both income tax rev- 
enue elasticities for 1989 and 1990 are lower (respectively, 1.30 and 1.07), but the decline 
resuking from the tax reform is similar. 
7. Effects on revenue 
The additional effect of the tax reform on revenue can now be determined. Starting point 
is tax revenue in 1989, amounting to DfI 66.8 billion or 13.8 percent of GDP. The relative 
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Table 1. Sources of change in Dutch income tax revenue elasticity. 
1989 Level 1990 Level Change (%)a Share in Claange 
Income tax elasticity xav 1.475 1.220 - 17.29 100.0 
Xav= l + : 
Effect of deductibility of social 
security contributions 0.039 0.000 -2.64 15.3 
Effect of personal exemptions 0.304 0.164 -9.49 54.9 
Effect of rate structure 0.161 0.122 -2.62 15.1 
Residual -0.029 -0.066 -2.55 14.7 
a. Including the positive threshold effect of 1.2 percentage points. This effect cannot appear as a separate entry 
in the table when equation (4) is used for the decomposition. 
change in revenue is by definition equal to the relative change in income times the income 
tax elasticity. For the years after the tax reform we calculated the following weighted average 
income changes: 1990:+2.3  percent, 1991:+3.9  percent, 1992:+4.5  percent, 1993: 
+3.4 percent .10 Using the calculated values for the income tax revenue lasticities in 1989 
and 1990, we obtain the results in Table 2. The decline in elasticity causes a 0.6 percent 
lower increase in tax revenue in 1990, when compared to the revenue that would be gener- 
ated by the old tax system. Note that this loss in revenue is additional to the revenue loss 
at the introduction ofthe Oort legislation. The additional revenue loss due to the tax reform 
rises to 3.8 percent in 1993. 
Table 2. Additional revenue loss 1990-1993. 
Changes in Tax Revenue w~h 
Income Tax Elasticity 
Difference in 
1989 a 1990 a Percentage Points a 
1990 +3.43% +2.84% -0.59 
1991 + 9.31% + 7.70% - 1.61 
1992 + 16.38 % + 13.55 % -2.83 
1993 +21.89% +18.11% -3.79 
a. Difference with respect to tax revenue in 1989. 
8. Conclusions 
It has been noted that a tax reform characterized by base broadening in exchange for a 
uniform proportionate rate reduction can cause a decrease in the income tax revenue lasticity 
(liability progression). This decrease is larger as the deductions to be eliminated are less 
income related. The elimination or reduction of personal exemptions, for example, causes 
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a relatively sharp drop in the income tax elasticity. However, this negative ffect can be 
(partly) compensated by either a positive effect on the tax elasticity of  people changing 
income brackets because of the elimination of deductions (the threshold effect) or by behav- 
ioral effects. In case the revenue lasticity falls, the reformed system generates less extra 
revenue after income growth than the old system. The tax reform then implies a reduction 
in future revenue. 
Our empirical analysis of the Dutch Oort reform in 1990 indeed shows such an effect. 
Using the microtax model of the Central Planning Bureau we calculated income tax revenue 
elasticities before and after the tax reform. The revenue lasticity of income taxes (including 
social security contributions) falls from 1.475 in 1989 to 1.220 in 1990, a decline of 17 
percent. More than 70 percent of this decline can be explained by the broadening of the 
tax base, while 15 percent is caused by the flattening of the rate structure. Especially the 
reduction of the personal exemptions has had a significant impact. The threshold effect 
appears to be relatively small. 
Because of the lower revenue lasticity, there is a revenue loss (additional to the tax reduc- 
tion at the introduction of the new legislation). Our simulations indicate a decrease in revenue 
by 0.6 percent in 1990, rising to almost 3.8 percent in 1993. This substantial revenue loss 
was overlooked when the Oort reform was implemented. When planning a tax reform, such 
dynamic revenue ffects should be taken into aceount. 
Acknowledgments 
We thank Victor Halberstadt, Ben van Velthoven, and Henk Vording for their useful com- 
ments on an earlier version of this paper. Michael Keen and two anonymous referees also 
provided many constructive and insightful suggestions. The views expressed as well as any 
remaining shortcomings are, of course, our own responsibility. 
No~s 
1. Kakwani (1977, p. 723) showed how a change in the tax schedule, holding pretax income distribution fLXed, 
affects the redistn'butive effect of taxation: "If there are two tax functions yielding the same average taxrate, 
the tax function with e uniformly higher tax elasticity will give the post-tax income distrfoution more equal 
than the tax function with lower tax elasticity. Similarly, if the tax functions have the same tax elasticity 
or progressivity, he tax function with higher average tax rate gives the post income distribution more equal 
than the tax function w~ giving !ow~r average tax r~e:" As Jakobsson (1976) and Khetan and Poddar (1976) 
have pointed out, there is a clear distinction between redistribution and tax progressivity. Some argue that 
the concept of residual income progression (measured by the lasticity of income after tax with respect to 
income before tax) is mote closely connected with the redistn'butivr effvct of a tax system. For discussion 
see Formby, Smgh, and Thistle (1990), Sider (1994), and Kiefer (1984). 
2. In special cases cq~ is a function of pretax income. When deductions are a proportion ofpretax income 
up to a ceiling c%s is 1 up to the ceiling and zero beyond. If an income floor is applied, oti,. ~ is larger than 
1 above the floor but decreasing with pretax income. In practice ai~, can also be larger than I because of 
behavioral effects: ffpretax income rises, one can be induced to make relatively more use of sp cific deductions. 
3. A lower degree of progressivity can of course have a positive effect on pretax income growth and thus on 
tax revenue. However, such behavioral effects arenot taken into account in this paper. 
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4. See Dosser (1961), who argued that income growth can change the incidence of a tax and, as a consequence, 
made a distinction between static and dynamic tax incidence. 
5. I SUS = 1.55 Dfl (July 1995). 
6. See, for example, Ri~shegrnting 1992, hoofdstuk IX 13, Financi~n, Tweede Kamer 1991-1992, 22, 300, 
hr. 2, p. 149. Indeed, just as in earlier years, the inflation correction has not been fully implemented in the 
period 1990-1994. 
7. For two reasons Kakwani's theorem (1977, p. 723), as mentioned in note 1, cannot be applied. First, the 
two tax functions (1989 and 1990) do not yield the same average tax rate. Second, the tax function of 1989 
has not uniformly higher tax elasticities. Thus, the distribution oftax liability in 1990 does not Lorenz domi- 
nate the distribution of tax liability in 1989. 
8. The individual and group elasticities are weighted by their share in total tax revenue. In the calculations of the 
total weighted revenue lasticity the self-employed, elderly, and income-transfer recipients are ot included 
because the shares of these groups in total revenue are not known in microtax 1989 and 1990. However, 
this will probably not cause a substantial bias in the calculations of the change in the revenue lasticity. 
9. The weighted average income tax elasticities for 1988--1993 are, respectively, 1.43, 1.48, 1.22, 1.22, 1.22, 
and 1.24. 
10. The ex post actual income changes of the various groups are w ighted by their share in total tax revenue 
(source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment). 
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